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Abstract
We provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on the measurement of
democracy and present an extensive update of the Machine Learning indicator
of Gründler and Krieger (2016, European Journal of Political Economy). Four
improvements are particularly notable: First, we produce a continuous and a
dichotomous version of the Machine Learning democracy indicator. Second, we
calculate intervals that reflect the degree of measurement uncertainty. Third,
we refine the conceptualization of the Machine Learning Index. Finally, we
largely expand the data coverage by providing democracy indicators for 186
countries in the period from 1919 to 2019.
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1 Introduction
Most applied researchers in economics and political science that examine the
determinants and consequences of democratic transitions use country-level data,
and thus have to choose an indicator that reflects how the level of democracy
varies across countries (see e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2015, 2019, Aidt and Leon,
2016, De Haan and Sturm, 2003, Dorsch and Maarek, 2019, 2020, Gassebner et al.,
2013, Harms and Ursprung, 2002, Potrafke, 2012, Zuazu, 2019). Making a well-
founded decision on this issue is difficult and requires a great amount of effort
because the literature provides various measures of democracy but no clear
guidelines that help practitioners to find an index that properly fits to their
purposes. The first part of this paper thus gives an extensive overview of
the literature on the measurement of democracy. In particular, we describe the
methodology of nine well-established democracy indicators and summarize their
major strengths and weaknesses in a user-friendly manner. We think that our
review fills a gap since existing reviews either require a lot of prior knowledge
(see e.g. Knutsen, 2010, Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) or only focus on two or three
indices (see e.g. Boese, 2019, Cheibub et al., 2010). Furthermore, in contrast to
previous literature surveys, we pay particular attention to the question of how
appropriate an index is for applied political economy research.
A recurring problem in existing measures of democracy is that the methods
applied for data aggregation are rather simplistic and sometimes even arbitrarily
chosen. To address this problem, we developed a Machine Learning approach
for measuring democracy in an early paper (see Gründler and Krieger, 2016). The
second part of this paper presents an extensive update of our initial index and
provides a comprehensive discussion of the underlying method. The large-scale
update is necessary for two key reasons: first, our original index has a coverage
of only 30 years, and second, its definition of democracy overlaps with other
institutional factors. To address these weak spots, we first completely revised
the conceptualization of our measure. Instead of assuming a maximalist concept,
we now work with a definition that includes only three dimensions: political
competition, political participation, and freedom of opinion. Our new concept
of democracy thus closely resembles the definition proposed by Dahl (1971). To
operationalize our concept of democracy, we compiled ten regime characteristics
that are available for 186 countries and the period from 1919 to 2019.
In the course of our update, we did not only improve the conceptualization
and the coverage of our democracy indicator but also developed two novel
methodological features. The first is that our Machine Learning approach now
produces both continuous and dichotomous indices.1 This novelty is important
because the type of scaling that is most appropriate depends on the research
question (see e.g. Collier and Adcock, 1999). The second new feature is that we
report confidence intervals for our democracy indices. These confidence intervals
are valuable since they allow practitioners to take measurement uncertainty into
account when conducting empirical analyses.
Compared with other measures of democracy, the particular feature of our
index is the Machine Learning approach used for data aggregation. In Gründler
and Krieger (2020), we illustrate in great detail the empirical strengths that this
1Our Machine Learning indices are publicly available and will be updated on a regular basis.
The data can be downloaded from our website: www.ml-democracy-index.net.
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approach has compared to the aggregation tools that have often been used for
producing continuous democracy indices. In particular, this related paper shows
that conventionally used aggregation tools produce indices that are implausibly
high (low) for highly autocratic (democratic) regimes. The main reason for this
problem is that the applied aggregation tools make relatively strong functional
assumptions. When using our Machine Learning approach, we can relax these
assumptions and thereby address this issue. In empirical applications, the main
consequence of this improvement is that OLS and 2SLS estimates are less likely
to be systematically biased.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the steps that need
to be taken when producing a measure of democracy. Section 3 discusses nine
frequently used democracy indicators. Section 4 presents our Machine Learning
indices. Section 5 concludes.
2 The measurement of democracy
The classical approach for producing a measure of democracy consists of three
steps (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). The first step defines the term “democratic
regime” (conceptualization). The second step identifies a set of observable regime
characteristics, reflecting the key components of the chosen concept of democracy
(operationalization). The last step establishes a rule that transforms the regime
characteristics into a uni-dimensional measure of democracy (aggregation). Below,
we briefly describe the main challenges that providers of democracy indices face
in each of these steps.
2.1 Conceptualization
The question of how to define “democracy” is the subject of a longstanding and
controversial discussion (for an overview, see Blaug and Schwarzmantel, 2016). Two
major challenges exist. The first is to choose the institutional features/dimensions
that are associated with “democracy”. The other challenge is to specify how these
dimensions interact with each other (see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002, Teorell et al.,
2019).
Regarding the first issue, the literature broadly distinguishes between three
types of concepts: narrow/minimalist concepts which mainly care about whether
elections for political posts are public and competitive, realistic concepts which
additionally require universal suffrage and basic political rights, and broad/
maximalist concepts which also include conditions on other socioeconomic aspects,
such as liberty or inequality (O’Donnell, 2001, Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). From a
conceptual perspective, all concepts of democracy are equally valid because no
objective criteria exist that allow to rank concepts of democracy (Guttman, 1994,
Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). From an empirical point of view, however, maximalist
concepts might be less appropriate than minimalist or realistic definitions since
they conceptually overlap with other economic aspects, such as civil liberties,
economic freedom, or the rule of law (Bjørnskov and Rode, 2020, Gutmann and
Voigt, 2018).
Two approaches exist on how the dimensions of a concept of democracy can
interact with each other (Teorell et al., 2019): the formative approach treats each
institutional aspect as a necessary condition of democracy, whereas the reflective
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approach assumes that all dimensions are (partial) substitutes and the result
of a common factor. We believe that both approaches have their merits and
that no clear answer exists on the question of which approach should be used
when producing a measure of democracy. We also think that this issue is
of great importance for both users and providers of democracy indices. For
providers, it matters because several decisions during the aggregation process
crucially depend on whether the chosen concept of democracy is formative or
reflective (for details, see Section 2.3). For users, this conceptual decision plays
a role because interpretations of empirical results must be consistent with the
underlying conceptual assumptions.
2.2 Operationalization
Most of the institutional features that are typically part of standard concepts of
democracy are not directly measurable. A common way to address this issue is to
create one (or more) expert-based sub-indices for each of the chosen dimensions
of democracy. The merit of this approach is that subjective scores can (at least
in principle) be built for any regime and any period. However, the flip side
is that coders might be biased due to personal experiences or interests and
that subjective assessments might considerably differ between coders. Munck and
Verkuilen (2002) thus recommend to complement expert-based sub-indicators with
objective regime characteristics. The main problem of using objective information
is that this data does usually not exist for all regimes and periods.
2.3 Aggregation
In mathematical terms, data aggregation requires to specify a function (f) that
maps a set of observable regime characteristics (z) onto a level of democracy (d):
dit = f(zit) ∀ zit =
(





where i denotes a country and t a particular point in time (Gründler and Krieger,
2016).
Munck and Verkuilen (2002) suggest that providers of democracy indices must
meet two main challenges during the aggregation process. The first is that they
must decide on the scale of the index. Four types of scaling exist: dichotomous
scales, ordinal scales, graded/quasi-continuous scales, and continuous scales. All of
these scales have their strengths and weaknesses. While indices with dichotomous
or ordinal scales often perform better from a conceptual perspective, continuous
and graded indicators have some advantages from an empirical perspective because
of their greater discriminating power (for further details, see Sections 3 and 4).
The other major challenge is to specify the aggregation function. This task is
difficult for two reasons: first, the form of the aggregation function needs to be
consistent with the conceptual assumptions, and second, neither the true level of
democracy nor the shape of the aggregation function are directly observable. The
conventional way to deal with the latter issue is to make specific assumptions
about the functional relationship between the observable regime characteristics and
the level of democracy. This approach is, however, often subject to criticism, in
particular when the democracy index has a continuous or graded scale (see e.g.
Cheibub et al., 2010, Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). A key reason for this criticism is
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that the chosen functional forms are usually quite simplistic and not grounded in
theory.
A common belief among users of democracy indices is that the methodological
details of the aggregation process are of little practical importance. Gründler and
Krieger (2020) challenge this view by showing theoretically and empirically that the
choice of the scale as well as the choice of the aggregation technique significantly
affects the size of regression coefficients when using a democracy indicator as a
dependent variable in an OLS or 2SLS regressions. In particular, scaling decision
have an effect on the amount of measurement uncertainty and thus on the size
of the attenuation bias. Furthermore, changes in the aggregation function of a
continuous index cause systematic changes in the index values of regimes at the
lower and/or upper end of the democracy spectrum, which in turn affects the
magnitude of both OLS and 2SLS estimates.
3 Popular democracy indicators
This section describes the methodologies, strengths, and weaknesses of nine widely
used measures of democracy (for a summary, see Table B.9). Our motivation is
twofold: First, we think that the literature lacks a paper that summaries the
main aspects of standard indices in an user-friendly manner.2 Second, we can
discuss and motivate our Machine Learning indicator (see Section 4) in a clearer




The Boix-Miller-Rosato (BMR) indicator is a dichotomous democracy index that
labels a regime as democratic (1) if it met the following conditions (Boix et al.,
2013):
• The majority of male citizens was eligible to vote.4
2The question that implicitly underlies our literature review is how useful a particular measure
of democracy is for empirical analyses. A legitimate question in this regard is whether the
existing measures should be evaluated from this perspective. We think that this is indeed the
case since democracy indices have been used in numerous empirical studies as a dependent or
independent variable. However, we do not believe that the empirical applicability is the only
dimension based on which democracy indices can be evaluated. The reason for why we pay
attention to this aspect is that an extensive discussion of the relevant theoretical questions
regarding the conceptualization/operationalization of democracy was already provided by Munck
and Verkuilen (2002). Our review will therefore complement rather than substitute Munck and
Verkuilen’s seminal work.
3As outlined in greater detail in Section 4, the basic reason for why we started to develop a
Machine Learning approach for measuring democracy was that we aimed to find an approach
that addresses the empirical problems that have been identified for existing democracy indices.
To understand the strengths of our method, it is thus of great importance to illustrate the
methodological advantages and disadvantages of existing indicators.
4In their latest update, the providers of the BMR index present a second measure of democracy
which additionally requires that the majority of female citizens had the right to vote in national
elections (Boix et al., 2018).
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• The executive power was directly or indirectly elected in popular elections
and is responsible to the voters or to a legislature.
• The legislature (and when directly elected the executive) was chosen in free
and fair elections.
3.1.2 Discussion
The most recent version of the BMR database includes democracy indices for 222
countries in the period from 1800 to 2015 (Boix et al., 2018). In terms of data
coverage, the BMR indicator is thus among the three best performing measures of
democracy. A second major strength of the BMR indicator is its methodological
consistency: Boix et al. (2013) first argue that the three institutional aspects that
they take into account when classifying regimes constitute necessary conditions for
democracy, and then apply operationalization and aggregation approaches that fit
together with their conceptual assumptions. Finally, the definition of democracy
underlying the BMR indicator only includes requirements on political competition
and political participation. This rather narrow conceptualization is notable since
conceptual overlaps with other institutional features (such as the rule of law or
economic freedom) are thus unlikely when applying the BMR index in a regression
analysis on the causes and consequence of democracy.
An objection against all dichotomous measures of democracy (and thus also
against the BMR index) is that these indicators lack discriminating power (Bollen
and Jackman, 1989). From an empirical perspective, a low degree of differentiation
creates problems, especially when the relationship between democracy (or one of its
dimensions) and an economic outcome is non-linear. For example, the BMR index
does not differentiate between regimes in which all male citizens have the right to
vote and regimes in which male suffrage is restricted. This implies that the BMR
index can hardly be used for examining how government expenditures respond to
institutional changes because some theories suggest that a U-shaped relationship
might exist between suffrage and public spending on human capital (see e.g. Aidt
et al., 2010). Another general objection against dichotomous democracy indices is
that transition years can often not precisely be identified because many political
systems change gradually.
Boix et al. (2013) define that regimes require “free” and “fair” elections to be
democratic. Operationalizing this condition is difficult since objective criteria for
“free” and “fair” do not exist. Consequently, all coding decisions for this crucial
condition are based on subjective evaluations. For many cases, such a subjective
assessment is uncontroversial. For the other cases, uncertainty measures should be
provided, according to Lührmann et al. (2018). The simple way of indicating the
existence of measurement uncertainty is to create a dummy variable that shows
whether coders are unsure about their assessment. The more sophisticated way is
to report a confidence interval that reflects the level of measurement uncertainty.
Boix et al. (2013) applies neither of these two approaches. Thus, testing whether the
findings of an empirical analysis depend on the handling of borderline countries is
impossible when using the BMR index.
Munck and Verkuilen (2002) prompt providers of democracy indicators to publish
both their final index and the underlying raw data. Boix et al. (2013) only partly
comply with this request since their published database does not include their raw
data. Besides transparency issues, this incomplete provision is problematic since
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users of the BMR measure can neither check whether their results depend on the




The Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) indicator is a binary measure of democracy that
was initially proposed by Alvarez et al. (1996) and later updated by Cheibub et al.
(2010) and Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). The DD indicator classifies a regime as
democratic (1) only if it satisfies the following four conditions:
• The head of government was elected by a popular vote or by a popularly
elected body.
• The members of the legislature were elected through a popular election.
• More than one party attended the parliamentary elections.
• An alternation in power took place under the same election rules that
brought the incumbent into power.
3.2.2 Discussion
The latest version of the DD index covers the period from 1950 to 2020 and is
available for 192 sovereign countries, 16 self-governing territories, and 96 colonies
(Bjørnskov and Rode, 2020). The total coverage of the DD index is thus smaller
than the coverage of the BMR index. For the Post-World-War-II period, however,
the DD index has two major advantages over the BMR index: first, it distinguish
between different types of colonies, and second, publicly available information exists
that indicates which condition(s) a country violates that is not classified as a
“democracy”.5 The latter feature is important not only for transparency reasons, but
also because it allows users to investigate whether their results are triggered by a
particular aspect of democracy. A merit that the DD index shares with the BMR
index is the consistency between the definition of democracy and the aggregation
procedure.
Besides the general objections against dichotomous measures regarding their low
discriminating power, the DD index is subject to criticism mainly for conceptual
reasons. Munck and Verkuilen (2002) suggest that the concept underlying the DD
indicator is too minimalistic since it does not include any requirement on political
participation. We agree with the view of Munck and Verkuilen (2002), but it is
important to mention that Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) add information on suffrage
rules to the DD database. Users of the DD indicator can thus simply extend the
definition of democracy to examine whether their regression results are robust to
conceptual changes. A second major conceptual problem of the DD index is the
condition that requires an alternation in power. Knutsen and Wig (2015) illustrate
that the DD indicator systematically misclassifies “young” democracies due to this
5Most providers of democracy indicators classify colonies as non-democratic regimes because their
governments could not freely decide on laws and policy measures.
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condition.6 A frequent consequence of this misclassification is that point estimates
are biased when using the DD index as the explanatory variable in a regression
analysis on the effects of institutional transitions (for details, see Knutsen and Wig,
2015).7
3.3 Polity IV indicator
3.3.1 Methodology
The Polity IV index is a quasi-continuous/graded democracy indicator that ranges
from −10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). To create this indicator,
Marshall et al. (2019) proceed in three steps: First, they assume a definition of
democracy that consists of five institutional aspects:
• Constraints on chief executive.
• Competitiveness of the chief executive recruitment.
• Openness of the chief executive recruitment.
• Regulation of participation.
• Competitiveness of participation.
Afterwards, they evaluate each country with more than 500,000 inhabitants with
regard to each of the five institutional aspects. Finally, they add together the five
sub-indicators developed in the previous step.
3.3.2 Discussion
The Polity IV indicator is available for the period from 1800 to 2018 and is
annually updated. The major strength of this measure of democracy is that it has
both a great coverage and substantial discriminating power. Furthermore, the five
sub-indicators are publicly available. Users can thus check whether their estimation
results are driven by particular aspects of democracy or depend on the aggregation
method.
Many conceptual and methodological concerns exist against the Polity index
(for extensive discussions, see Boese, 2019, Cheibub et al., 2010). From a conceptual
perspective, two of them are particularly relevant for practitioners. First, the
concept of democracy underlying the Polity index overlaps with other institutional
factors. For example, the dimension “constraints on chief executive” takes into
account the independence of the courts (Marshall et al., 2019), which in turn is a
component of most indices measuring the rule of law (Gutmann and Voigt, 2018).
Second, the providers of the Polity indicator suspend their coding procedure if
a regime has no or a transitional government or if it is occupied by another
country. To fill the data gaps that originate from these suspensions, Marshall
6For example, post-Apartheid South Africa is classified as an autocracy even though free and fair
elections have been regularly held since 1994. The reason for this classification is that the African
National Congress (ANC) won all national elections since the enfranchisement of black citizens in
1994.
7Alvarez et al. (1996) admit that the alternation rule is likely to create a systematic error in their
classification.
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Table 1 Freedom House Indicator: Creation of PR and CL index.
+1 +2 +3 +4 +5 + 6 +7
PR index 36 – 40 30 – 35 24 – 29 18 – 23 12 – 17 6 – 11 0 – 5
CL index 53 – 60 52 – 44 35 – 43 26 – 35 17 – 25 8 – 16 0 – 7
Notes: This table shows how Freedom House transforms the sum of the expert-based regime characteristics
on political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) into graded indicators with seven-tiered scales.
et al. (2019) propose to assign the value of ±0 to such a regime. We argue that
this simple interpolation procedure is problematic since it often creates spurious
changes in the level of democracy.8
Several discussants of the Polity index criticize that the 21 categories overlap,
especially at the center of the spectrum (see e.g. Gleditsch and Ward, 1997). We
share this view, but also think that classifying hybrid regimes without having any
measurement uncertainty is impossible. However, in contrast to other indices, the
Polity database does not provide confidence intervals that indicate the extent of
measurement uncertainty. A second major methodological problem of the Polity
index is the aggregation rule. Munck and Verkuilen (2002) argue that weighting all
regime characteristics equally is inappropriate because some of them are redundant.
Gründler and Krieger (2020) and Teorell et al. (2019) show that the application of
an additive rule creates doubtful classifications at the lower end of the spectrum.
Cheibub et al. (2010) and Treier and Jackman (2008) conclude that the aggregation
procedure used to compute the Polity index lacks any theoretical foundation.
3.4 Freedom House Indicator
3.4.1 Methodology
Freedom House (FH ) publishes two democracy indices. The first index is graded/
quasi-continuous and ranges from +2 (most democratic) to +14 (most autocratic),
while the second is ordinal and consists of three categories (free, partly free, not
free). Below, we will mainly focus on the first index since the ordinal measure is
just a simple extension of the graded index.9
FH distinguishes between two aspects of democracy: political rights (PR) and civil
liberties (CV). For each of the two, FH creates a separate index, ranging from +1 to
+7. The final FH indicator is the sum of the PR and the CL indicator. To produce
the PR/CL index, FH takes 10/15 regime characteristics into account. All of them
are expert-based and vary from 0 to +4. The PR/CL index of a regime depends
on the sum of the 10/15 regime characteristics. In Table 1, we show the allocation
scheme (for further details, see Freedom House, 2019).
8 For example, when applying this procedure, the Polity index of Poland increases from −6 to 0
in 1939 when Poland was occupied by Nazi Germany.
9A country is classified as “free” when the graded FH index does not exceed +5, as “partly free”
when the graded FH index is larger than +5 and at most +10, and “not free” when the graded
FH index exceeds +10.
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3.4.2 Discussion
The FH indices exist for almost all independent countries of the world and most
self-governing territories. However, the time spans of the FH measures are relatively
short since they are only available from 1972 onward. Compared to the Polity IV
indicator, a clear advantage of the FH indicators is that spurious changes due to
anarchy or foreign occupation do not exist. Furthermore, FH provides much more
information about the institutional aspects that the coders take into account when
evaluating countries.
From a practical perspective, a key problem of the FH indicators is that their
underlying concept of democracy is maximalist and thus overlaps with many other
concepts (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Some scholars try to address this issue by
using only the PR index. We agree that this approach alleviates the problem to
some extent since the CL index includes most of the institutional aspects that are
not part of a narrow or realistic definition of democracy. However, we also believe
that using only the PR index does not fully solve the problem since this measure
takes political corruption into account.
The FH indicators share the basic methodological weaknesses of the Polity IV index
(i.e. no confidence intervals, overlapping categories, non-theorized aggregation rule). In
addition to them, the FH indices have two further weak spots: first, all threshold
values are completely arbitrary, and second, users can hardly investigate whether
their results depend on the aggregation rule because the 25 expert-based regime




Acemoglu et al. (2019) start their work with the claim that all democracy indices
indicate spurious regime transitions and argue that this issue can be considerably
alleviated when creating a dichotomous measure that combines the ratings of the
Polity, FH, DD, and BMR indicator according to the following rules:
• A regime is “democratic” when the Polity index is greater than 0 and the
FH index does not exceed 10.
• A regime is “democratic” when the Polity index does not exist, the FH
index does not exceed 10, and either the DD or the BMR index indicates
“democratic”.
• A regime is “democratic” when the FH index does not exist, the Polity
index is greater than 0, and either the DD or the BMR index indicates
“democratic”.
• A regime is “democratic” when neither the Polity index nor the FH index
exist, and the other two indices indicate “democratic”.
• A regime is “non-democratic” when none of the former four cases applies.
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3.5.2 Discussion
The Acemoglu-Naidu-Restrepo-Robinson (ANRR) database includes indices for 184
countries and the period form 1960 to 2010. Compared to most other popular
democracy indicators, a key advantage of the ANRR index is that all underlying
measures are publicly available and are updated on a regular basis. Users can
thus easily extend the time span of the ANRR index if this is needed for their
research project.
We argue that the ANRR indicator has severe shortcomings. First of all, the
underlying concept of democracy is not the same for all country-year observations.
A reason for this inconsistency is that FH defines “democracy” in a much broader
way than the providers of the other indices (for details, see Sections 3.1 – 3.4) has
only been publishing indices since 1972. Second, since the Polity and the FH index
conceptually overlap with other institutional factors (see Sections 3.3 and 3.4), the
ANRR index does as well. Third, Acemoglu et al. (2019) themselves indicate that
their classification method creates spurious regime changes. To address this issue,
Acemoglu et al. (2019) manually recode all transitions that are not plausible from
their perspective.10 We believe that these reclassifications are problematic since no
selection criteria exist that clearly suggest when a recoding is necessary. Fourth,
uncertainty measures do not exist. Finally, the thresholds defined for the FH and




The measure of democracy by Vanhanen (2000) has a continuous scale and builds
upon a definition that considers political participation and political competition as
necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy. Vanhanen (2000) operationalizes
these two institutional features with two objective variables: the voter-population-
ratio and the share of votes that was not won by the strongest party/candidate.11
The Vanhanen index is the product of these two regime characteristics.
3.6.2 Discussion
Vanhanen’s indicator is available for more than 190 countries and the period from
1810 to 2018. Updates of the index are not provided annually, but on a regular
basis. The regime characteristics are freely accessible. Users can thus easily test
whether their findings depend on the aggregation technique.12 Another remarkable
feature is the comprehensive documentation file which lists (by country and year)
the used data sources.
10For example, when applying the basic procedure of Acemoglu et al. (2019) without manual
adjustment, the ANRR index suggests that South Africa moved from autocracy to democracy in
the mid 1980s. Acemoglu et al. (2019) argue that this transition is spurious since the Apartheid
regime was in place until 1994.
11To account for the constitutional differences across democratic regimes, Vanhanen (2000) weights
presidential and legislative elections according to their relevance for the political decision making
process.
12Vanhanen (2000) admits that his aggregation method cannot fully be grounded in theory and thus
recommends this kind of robustness check.
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Munck and Verkuilen (2002) criticize the Vanhanen index especially due to the
two regime characteristics used to operationalize political competition and political
participation and the way by which Vanhanen (2000) aggregates them. The main
problem is that regimes are only classified as fully democratic by a multiplicative
indicator when all underlying regime characteristics reach their highest level. With
regard to the Vanhanen indicator, this implies that parliaments need to be highly
fractionalized and that turnout rates have to be 100 percent in fully democratic
countries. We argue that these requirements are excessive. For example, if voters
voluntarily abstain from voting, indicating a lack of democracy is not appropriate
from our perspective.
A second major problem of the Vanhanen indicator is that precise information
on the two objective regime characteristics are not available for all country-year
observations. To address this issue, Vanhanen (2000) applies various interpolation
procedures. We think that this is an adequate way for dealing with missing raw
data. However, we also believe that providers of objective indices should publish
uncertainty measures if their data is incomplete. For the Vanhanen index, such
measures do not exist.
3.7 Unified Democracy Score
3.7.1 Methodology
The Unified Democracy Score (UDS ) is a continuous indicator that was initially
developed by Pemstein et al. (2010). The basic idea behind the UDS is to create
a new measure of democracy out of ten existing indices, using a Bayesian latent
variable approach. The list of underlying indices includes: the DD, the FH, the
Polity, and the Vanhanen index, as well as the measures proposed by Arat (1991),
Bollen (1999), Bowman et al. (2005), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), Hadenius (1992),
and Gasiorowski (1996).13
3.7.2 Discussion
The first version of the UDS covers the 1946-2000 period and exists for almost all
countries of the world (Pemstein et al., 2010). A recent update by Márquez (2018)
improves the coverage such that the UDS is now available from 1815 onward. A
major strength of the approach used by Pemstein et al. (2010) is that it does not
only produce an index for each country-year observation, but also a measure that
indicates the extent of measurement uncertainty.14
According to Pemstein et al. (2010), a second strength of their Bayesian latent
variable approach is that it can combine various measures of democracy although
their coverage rates notably differ. However, Gründler and Krieger (2016) show that
using this methodological feature comes at high costs since it creates conceptual
inconsistencies and spurious changes in the estimated level of democracy when the
13In our review, we do not discuss the indices by Arat (1991), Bollen (1999), Bowman et al. (2005),
Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), Hadenius (1992), and Gasiorowski (1996) because they are hardly
used anymore.
14The confidence intervals of the UDS are largest for highly autocratic/democratic regimes and
shortest for hybrid regimes. Teorell et al. (2019) argue that this pattern is counterintuitive. We
share this view and thus believe that the confidence intervals of the UDS should be interpreted
with caution.
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number of underlying indicators changes. Furthermore, the Bayesian latent variable
approach often creates implausibly high/low scores for highly autocratic/democratic
regimes. An empirical consequence of this problem is that regression results are
systematically biased (Gründler and Krieger, 2020).
3.8 Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy
3.8.1 Methodology
The Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED) by Skaaning et al. (2015) is an
ordinal and expert-based measure that distinguishes between the following types of
political regimes.
• Regimes without elections.
• Regimes with no-party or one-party elections.
• Regimes with multiparty parliamentary election.
• Regimes with multiparty parliamentary and presidential elections.
• Regimes with minimally competitive multiparty election for legislature and
executive.
• Regimes with minimally competitive multiparty election and full male or
female suffrage for legislature and executive.
• Regimes with minimally competitive multiparty election and full male and
female suffrage for legislature and executive.
3.8.2 Discussion
The index proposed and regularly updated by Skaaning et al. (2015) starts in 1789
and provides information on all independent countries of the world. LIED is thus
among the democracy indicators with the best coverage. Furthermore, due to its
clear coding rules, its narrow definition of democracy, and its theoretically well
grounded aggregation procedure, we believe that LIED can be hardly criticized
from a conceptual or methodological perspective.
Despite its great merits, we have some doubts whether LIED can be effectively
used in applied studies. The key problem is its ordinal scale. The correct way of
using LIED in a regression analysis in which the level of democracy serves as an
explanatory variable is to create a dummy variable for each of the seven types of
regimes. Of course, this is unproblematic in an OLS analysis. However, an OLS
estimate can usually not be causally interpreted. Many scholars thus also present
results from instrumental variable regressions. Running this type of regression with
the measure by Skaaning et al. (2015) is virtually impossible since one instrumental
variable would be necessary for each regime type.15
15An inappropriate approach to address this problem is to treat LIED as a graded democracy
indicator and to add it as a single variable to the regression model. The reason for why this
approach does not work is that the degree of democratic improvement is not always the same
when switching from one regime type to the next. For example, moving from a regime without
elections to a regime with single-party elections hardly increases the degree of democratization
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Table 2 V-Dem’s Polyarchy index: Regime Characteristics.





Expert-Based 16 Formative Manual 0.25
Associational
Autonomy













Expert-based 9 Reflective Bayesian item
responds model
0.25
Suffrage Objective 1 - - 0.125
Notes: This table lists the five regime characteristics that constitute the Polyarchy index by Teorell et al.
(2019).
3.9 V-Dem’s Polyarchy Index
3.9.1 Methodology
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is an international research project that aims to
provide institutional information on all countries of the world. In total, the V-Dem
database includes more than 450 regime characteristics and five democracy indices
(Coppedge et al., 2019). Since these indicators differ mainly with regard to their
underlying concept of democracy, we do not discuss all of them, but focus on the
Polyarchy index by Teorell et al. (2019). We choose this index because the other
democracy indicators in the V-Dem database are only extensions of the Polyarchy
index.
V-Dem’s Polyarchy index is a continuous measure of democracy that takes five
regime characteristics into account (see Table 2). Four of them consist of various
expert-based sub-indicators. The procedure used to aggregate these sub-indicators
depends on whether a regime characteristic is reflective or formative (for further
details, see Teorell et al., 2019).
Teorell et al. (2019) apply a two-step procedure to transform their five regime
characteristics into the Polyarchy index. In the first step, they create an additive
and a multiplicative index (for the weighting scheme, see Table 2). In the second
step, Teorell et al. (2019) compute the Polyarchy index by taking the mean of the
additive and the multiplicative indicator.
3.9.2 Discussion
V-Dem’s Polyarchy index is available for 202 countries in the period from 1789 to
2019. The underlying definition of democracy is realistic and thus hardly overlaps
with other institutional aspects. In addition, the selection and construction of the
regime characteristics is well grounded in theory. Another notable feature is that
Teorell et al. (2019) compute a confidence interval for each rating. All raw data is
because political competition still does not exist. When instead switching from single-party to
multiparty elections, the increase in the degree of democratization is remarkable because a key
condition of democracy is then at least partly satisfied.
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publicly available and the code book of the V-Dem database clearly describes their
coding rules and aggregation methods.
We believe that the aggregation procedure is the only weak spot of V-Dem’s
Polyarchy indicator. Two problems are notable. First, Teorell et al. (2019) do not
provide a clear reasoning for why their additive and their multiplicative indicator
should be equally weighed and additively combined. Second, Gründler and Krieger
(2020) illustrate that combining an additive and a multiplicative index does not
suffice to eradicate the methodological weaknesses of additive and multiplicative
indicators.
3.10 Recommendations
From a practitioner’s point of view, Sections 3.1 – 3.9 might raise the question
which of the nine aforementioned democracy indicators should be applied in an
empirical investigation. Responding to this question in a general and profound
manner is difficult since each index has its advantages and disadvantages and
it often crucially depends on the research design and the research question how
problematic a particular weak point actually is. For instance, the ordinal scale
of the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (see Section 3.8) is unproblematic
when running OLS regressions but cause empirical problems if a 2SLS approach
is planned as the identification strategy.
To find a measure of democracy that fits well to their research project, we
recommend researchers to ask themselves three basic questions and to use the
principle of exclusion. The first basic question is which of the available indices
creates a conceptual overlap with the factor whose relationship to democracy is
analyzed in the research project. For example, if a scholar aims to show how
political institutions affect economic institutions, he/she cannot use a democracy
indicator that takes into account aspects such as judiciary independence or the
rule of law. From our perspective, such conceptual overlaps are especially likely
when using measures with broad definitions such as the Freedom House indices
(see Section 3.4), the Unified Democracy Score (see Section 3.7), and the ANRR
index (see Section 3.5). Second, practitioners can restrict their list of potential
indices when deciding whether they assume a formative or a reflective concept
(for details, see Section 2.1). Finally, we think that researchers should become
clear about whether a continuous or dichotomous democracy indicator is more
appropriate for their analysis (for details, see Section 2.3 and Collier and Adcock,
1999).
Of course, even if scholars answer the three above-mentioned questions, it is
possible that they are left with more than one democracy indicator. In such
a case, we recommend studying the properties of the eligible indicators in some
detail. In particular, when a decision needs to be made between different binary
indicators, we argue that those measures that are based on arbitrary thresholds
(see e.g. the ANRR index) should not be chosen because the selection of the
threshold shapes the regression results (see Bogaards, 2012, Gründler and Krieger,
2020). If the shortlist includes several continuous indices, we believe that it is
important to check the aggregation procedures since the aggregation method has
a significant effect on the magnitude of the regression coefficients (Gründler and
Krieger, 2020). In any case, we think that researchers should present robustness
checks in which they illustrate how their results change if they replace their
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preferred democracy indicator with another index that is appropriate for their
research question.
4 Machine Learning Indicator
4.1 Motivation
We started our project from the observation that many existing measures of
democracy are subject to severe criticism due to their aggregation methods. A
frequently lamented weak point is that the assumptions about the functional
relationship between the regime characteristics and the level of democracy are
arbitrary and too simplistic. Our main objective is to address these issues. To
this end, we will present and discuss a Machine Learning approach that solves
highly non-linear optimization problems to identify an appropriate aggregation
function.
4.2 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a supervised Machine Learning technique for
pattern recognition that aims to reveal the unknown relationship between a set of
input characteristics and an outcome variable (Steinwart and Christmann, 2008). In
comparison to conventionally used statistical methods (e.g. OLS or GMM), a key
feature of SVM is that one does not have to explicitly specify the function that
maps the inputs onto the output. SVM is thus a particularly useful tool if the
unknown functional relationship is complex (Bennett and Campbell, 2000, Guenther
and Schonlau, 2016).16
To compute democracy indices, we will use a SVM classification and a SVM
regression tool.17 The key requirement for using these tools is to have a set of
observations for which we observe both the inputs and the output. In our case,
meeting this prerequisite is not trivial because democracy is often considered as
a latent variable. In Section 4.3.1, we will argue that the level of democracy is
observable for some regimes and that we can exploit these regimes to reveal the
functional relationship between a set of regime characteristics and the degree of
democratization.
4.3 Methodology
We now provide a general description of how we use SVM methods to produce
measures of democracy. To this end, we assume that we have a sample Z that
includes n  0 country-year observations (i, t) for which we observe the regime
characteristics z1, . . . , zr. Below, we refer to this sample as priming data.
16Because of its high prediction accuracy in complex situations, SVM tools have been used in a
variety of research fields. For example, medical scientists use SVM tools to classify cancer cells
(see e.g. Guyon et al., 2002).
17Appendix A provides a short description of the mathematical foundations of Support Vector




Applying SVM tools for the measurement of democracy requires a set of regimes
(priming data) based on which the unknown functional relationship between the
regime characteristics and the level of democracy can be learned. Satisfying this
prerequisite is difficult because regimes are suited only when we can directly (i.e.
without knowing the true aggregation function) observe their level of democracy,
In the political science literature, it is well-established that the classification of
regimes whose levels of democracy lie at the ends of the dictatorship-democracy-
spectrum is uncontroversial (see Cheibub et al., 2010, Lindberg et al., 2014).18 For
example, the vast majority of social scientists agrees that Nazi Germany was an
autocracy, whereas today’s Germany is widely considered a democratic regime. We
argue that a negligibly low degree of disagreement about how to classify a regime
implies that its level of democracy is directly observable. We are therefore also
convinced that uncontroversial regimes are an appropriate choice for building the
priming data.
4.3.2 Aggregation procedure
For a given set of priming data P, we proceed in five steps to transform the
regime characteristics into a measure of democracy. In the first step, we decide
on the scale of the democracy index. The existing options are: i) a dichotomous
scale, or ii) a continuous scale that ranges from 0 (fully autocratic) to 1 (fully
democratic). In the second step, we randomly select the training set Ts out of
the priming data P.19 In the third step, we use the training set Ts and a SVM
method to estimate the aggregation function:
fs : Rr → D where D = {0, 1} or D = [0, 1].
The choice of the SVM technique thereby depends on the scaling decision taken
in the first step. When producing a dichotomous measure, we apply the SVM
classification tool (see Appendix A.1). Otherwise, we use the SVM regression
tool (see Appendix A.2).20 In the fourth step, we use the aggregation function fs
18Lindberg et al. (2014) literally write that “almost everyone agrees that Switzerland is democratic
and North Korea is not.” In a similar vein, Cheibub et al. (2010) point out that “no measure
will produce very different ratings of political regimes in, say, the United Kingdom, Sweden, North
Korea or Sudan.”
19We use a uniformly distributed random number generator to determine the total number of
observations in the training set Ts. The size of the training set is between 20 and 50 percent
of the size of the priming data set:
| Ts | ∼ U ( 0.2 · | P |, 0.5 · | P |)
Note that changing the possible size of the training set has no notable effect on the final
democracy indicators (results available upon request).
20A few methodological choices are necessary when using these SVM tools. Both methods require
the choice of a penalization parameter C and a kernel function (see Appendix A). We set the
penalization parameter C equal to 1 as proposed by Mattera and Haykin (1999) and apply the
conventional Gaussian RBF kernel as recommended by Guenther and Schonlau (2016). Using the
SVM regression tool additionally requires to choose a margin parameter ε and labels for the
observations in the priming data. We set the margin parameter to 0.025 and set the labels for
autocratic/democratic regimes in the priming data to 0.025/0.975. Our parameter choice implies
that the degree of democratization of autocratically (democratically) labeled regimes can vary
between 0 (0.95) and 0.05 (1) without penalization.
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for each country-year observation (i, t) in sample Z. In the last step, we repeat
the process from step 2 to step 4 for all iterations s ∈ {0, . . . , smax}.21
4.3.3 Output
The aggregation tool described in the previous section produces three outputs. The
first is a continuous or dichotomous measure that reflects the level of democracy
of any country-year observation in the sample. We create this index by taking
























The third output is a distribution of indices that consists of the percentiles of
the smax indices:
∆it = {d0it, d1it, . . . , d99it , d100it }
where djit denotes the j-th percentile.
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4.4 Implementation
To produce an SVM indicator in practice, we need to compile a set of regime
characteristics and have to choose the priming data. In this section, we briefly
describe how we addressed these issues in our initial work and describe how we
improved the democracy index that we published a few years ago. We also give
a description of how we revised our index in order to eradicate the drawbacks of
the initial Machine Learning Democracy indicator.
4.4.1 Initial setup
In Gründler and Krieger (2016), we used our SVM approach to create continuous
democracy indicators for 185 countries in the period from 1981 to 2011. The
underlying regime characteristics came from different sources, including Cingranelli
et al. (2014), Freedom House (2019), Gibney et al. (2013), and Vanhanen (2000), and
captured a variety of institutional factors. To select country-year observations that
can serve as priming data, we used the Polity IV index and labeled a regime as
democratic (autocratic) if its Polity score was equal to +10 (smaller than −7).
While solving the problem of arbitrary aggregation, our initial Machine Learning
democracy indicator has three weak points. The first is its relatively low temporal
21In our baseline specification, we set smax = 2000. This choice ensures that our aggregation
procedure converges. The numerical evidence is available upon request.
22In Section 4.5 and 4.6, we will show that the second and third output of our aggregation
procedure are useful to reflect the extent of measurement uncertainty.
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Table 3 Machine Learning democracy indices: Regime Characteristics.
Dimension Regime Characteristics Type Description
Political Participation Part I Objective Share of adult citizens with legally
granted suffrage.
Part II Objective Ratio between number of voters and
number of eligible voters.
Part III Objective Ratio between number of voters and
number of inhabitants.
Political Competition Comp I Subjective Measure of party pluralism.
Comp II Objective Share of votes not won by the strongest
party/candidate.
Comp III Objective Share of parliamentary seats not won by
the strongest party.
Comp IV Objective Ratio between share of votes won by
runner-up party/candidate and share of
votes won by strongest party/candidate.
Comp V Objective Ratio between share of parliamentary
seats won by runner-up party and share
of parliamentary seats won by strongest
party.
Freedom of Opinion FreeOp I Subjective Measures freedom of discussion of male
citizens.
FreeOp II Subjective Measures freedom of discussion of female
citizens.
Notes: This table lists the ten regime characteristics that constitute our Machine Learning democracy
indicators.
coverage. The second key weakness is its concept of democracy, which is relative
broad and thus overlaps with some other factors such as economic freedom or the
rule of law. Finally, some of the regime characteristics are expert-based ratings
that have often been criticized because of their aggregation procedures. When
using them, we thus face the risk that their methodological problems cause biases
in our Machine Learning democracy index.
4.4.2 Revision: conceptualization and operationalization
To address the weak spots of the initial Machine Learning democracy index,
we completely revised its conceptualization and operationalization. Our concept
of democracy now consists of three dimensions (political participation, political
competition, freedom of opinion) and thus closely resembles the theory of Dahl
(1971). We believe that Dahl’s realistic definition of democracy is an appropriate
choice because it does not conceptually overlap with other institutional factors.
We compile ten regime characteristics to operationalize Dahl’s seminal concept
of democracy (for a summary, see Table 3). Three of them are subjective/expert-
based. The other seven regime characteristics are based on objective information.
Our selection thus satisfies Munck and Verkuilen’s guidelines, requesting the use
of both types of regime characteristics. We also give up the use of aggregated
data and make sure that each regime characteristic belongs to only one of our
three dimensions of democracy. Finally, we take care to ensure that our regime
characteristics cover both de facto and de jure aspects.
We follow Dahl (1971) and define political participation as peoples’ right to
decide about their political rulers in public elections. To operationalize this
dimension of democracy, we exploit three regime characteristics. The first is
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the share of adults with legally granted suffrage. Our primary data sources is
the V-Dem database (see Coppedge et al., 2019). In addition, we collect data23
on voter turnout and calculated the voter-population ratio to capture de facto
restrictions of the franchise (e.g. due to material law or political repression).
We admit that these two variables are imperfect measures of non-constitutional
disfranchisement since a low turnout rate can also be explained by voluntary
abstentions.24 However, we also think that no other objective measures exist and
that using only measures on de jure restrictions of the suffrage is an even worse
approach.
Political competition exists when voters can choose between politicians with
different party affiliations (Przeworski, 1991, Schumpeter, 1942). We operationalize
this important dimension through five regime characteristics. Our first regime
characteristic is a subjective index of party pluralism that distinguishes between
five categories.25 The four other regime characteristics are: (i) the share of
votes not won by the strongest party/candidate,26 (ii) the share of parliamentary
seats not won by the strongest party, (iii) the share of votes won by the
runner-up party/candidate divided by the share of votes won by the strongest
party/candidate, and (iv) the share of seats in parliament won by the runner-up
party divided by the share of seats won by the strongest party.
In line with Dahl (1971), we define the freedom of opinion as people’s right
to choose their sources of information and to express their political views even
if these views are not compatible with the views of the government. To
operationalize this third dimension of our definition, we exploit gender-specific
ratings on the freedom of discussion from the V-Dem database (Coppedge et al.,
2019).
4.4.3 Revision: priming data
In the course of our update, we also modified the procedure that we apply
to identify country-year observations that are appropriate for being part of the
priming data. Our selection is now based on the UDS and V-Dem’s Polyarchy
index instead of the Polity index. In particular, we label a regime as highly
23We compile our objective data from various sources. A detailed documentation can be found
here: www.ml-democracy-index.net.
24Similarly, Hadenius (1992) argues that a high turnout rate does not necessarily correlate with
democratic institutions. He illustrates his argument by referring to the Soviet Union in
which voter turnout always exceeded 99 percent. Furthermore, since voting is compulsory in
some countries, one might wonder about the appropriateness of using turnout as a regime
characteristic. We share all these concerns. However, we also think that the aforementioned
objections are of relatively little relevance in our case because we do not assume a linear
relationship between the turnout rate and the level of democracy when applying the SVM
algorithm. We rather assume a non-linear relationship and that the effect of turnout on
democracy depends on the institutional environment. In Section 4.5.7, we illustrate this feature
of the SVM approach.
25The five categories are: (i) there are no political parties, (ii) one legal party exists, (iii)
there are multiple parties but opposition parties are faced with significant obstacles, (iv) there
are multiple parties but opposition parties are faced with small obstacles, and (v) there are
multiple parties and virtually no obstacles for opposition parties. To construct this measure,
we compile information provided by the V-Dem database (Coppedge et al., 2019), the database
of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2019), and four election handbooks (see Nohlen et al., 1999,
Nohlen et al., 2001, Nohlen, 2005, Nohlen and Stöver, 2010).
26Following Vanhanen (2000), we weight parliamentary and presidential elections according to their
relevance for the political decision making process.
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democratic (autocratic) if it belongs to the upper (lower) decile of either of these
indices. In total, our new priming data consists of 2.975 country-year observations
(for a complete list, see Table B.1).
We changed our labeling procedure for three main reasons. First, we found
during some methodological and plausibility checks that using two indicators
instead of one indicator slightly improves the quality of our Machine Learning
indices. Second, since the Polity index has a graded scale, we cannot select
a similar number of highly autocratic/democratic regimes without applying an
asymmetric labeling procedure. Finally, we get a more heterogeneous sample
of highly autocratic/democratic regimes when replacing the old with the new
procedure.
4.5 Methodological discussion
4.5.1 Is there consensus on the regimes in the priming data?
To produce valid democracy indices, our Machine Learning method requires that
the priming data includes regimes that are correctly labeled as highly democratic
or highly autocratic. We proceeded in two steps to test whether our labeled
country-year observations can be considered as suitably chosen. First, we checked
whether our labels contradict with the descriptions in Nohlen’s (1999, 2001, 2005,
2010) election handbooks, or with reports published by NGOs and international
organizations. We found no country-year observation whose label is completely
unreasonable and only very few cases where the label might be debatable. For
example, our priming data includes Uganda in 1980 as an autocratic country-year
observation. We believe that the label “autocracy” is reasonable due to military
coup in May 1980, but not completely uncontroversial since a multiparty election
took place in December 1980.
In our second validity test, we checked how other democracy indices evaluate
the regimes included in the priming data. The list of other indicators includes the
DD index, the BMR index, the Polity IV index, the FH index, and the LIED
index. Our results suggest that a great consensus exist regarding the regimes
in the priming data (for details, see Table B.2). For example, 99.44 percent of
the democratically labeled country-year observations have a Polity score of +8 or
larger.
4.5.2 Incorrect labels
To get a better understanding of how our method reacts if the priming includes
country-year observations that are wrongly classified, we run falsification tests
in which we label some democratic regimes as autocracies and some autocratic
regimes as democracies. Table B.3 reports the results of one of these falsification
tests. In this particular test, we falsified the labels of the 32 Irish and the
32 Cuban observations in the priming data. Columns 1 and 4 of Table B.3
show that the falsification causes, on average, only minor changes in the Machine
Learning indicators. For example, the continuous index changes, on average, by
only 0.010 when we replace the original priming data with the falsified priming
data. The remaining columns of Table B.3 illustrate that the changes in the
democracy scores are also negligible for the two countries whose labels were
falsified. This robustness is notable since it implies that our Machine Learning
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tool identifies and automatically corrects wrongly labeled regimes, at least if their
number is relatively small.
4.5.3 Representativeness of the priming data
Autocracies differ greatly from each other (see e.g. Cheibub et al., 2010, Geddes
et al., 2014). This institutional heterogeneity is a notable challenge for us since
our Machine Learning tool can only produce plausible democracy indices if the
priming data includes autocratic regimes of all types. To check how well we
perform in this respect, we proceeded in three steps. First, we tested whether
our priming data includes civil, military, communist, and royal dictatorships as
defined by Cheibub et al. (2010). Second, we checked whether we labeled both
autocracies with and without elections. Third, we tested whether the autocratic
regimes in the priming data differ in their durability. Table B.4 presents the
results of our analysis and suggests that our labeled regimes nicely reflect the
existing institutional heterogeneity among autocracies.
Institutional differences also exist among democratic regimes. We thus also
checked whether our priming data includes different types of democracies. Table
B.5 illustrates that this is indeed the case. In particular, we show that our
democratically labeled regimes differ in their form of government (presidential,
semi-presidential, parliamentarian), their total number of parliamentary chambers
(unicameral, bicameral), and their voting system (proportional, majoritarian).
4.5.4 Alternative priming data
In our baseline version, we used the upper/lower deciles of the UDS and of
V-Dem’s Polyarchy index to find regimes that are highly democratic/autocratic
and thus suited for being part of the priming data. We chose these indices
because of their detailed scales and their great coverage rates, but also admit
that the selection of the labeling criteria is to some extent arbitrary. We thus
conducted various tests that analyze how our Machine Learning indicators react
when we use other criteria. Table B.6 reports the results of five of these tests
and suggests that our democracy indices are robust to changes in the labeling
criteria. This robustness is notable but hardly surprising because of the great
consensus on the regimes at the ends of the autocracy-democracy spectrum (see
Section 4.5.1).
4.5.5 Measurement uncertainty in regime characteristics
A key problem of using objective regime characteristics is that they typically
suffer from measurement error because of interpolated or inconsistent data. For
example, Adam Carr’s Election Archive indicates a turnout rate of 80.4 percent
for the Argentinian presidential election in 2019, whereas the database of the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems suggests a turnout rate of 78.9
percent. The common way of dealing with this kind of measurement error is
to produce a confidence interval for each democracy score (see e.g. Treier and
Jackman, 2008).
We argue that the upper and lower percentile of the distribution of indices
produced by our Machine Learning approach (for details, see Section 4.3.3) can
be used as bounds of a confidence interval that captures the distortions caused
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by the measurement errors in the raw data. To substantiate our view, we first
generate randomly biased regime characteristics:
ẑj = zj + ηj with ηj ∼ U (−λ · σzj , +λ · σzj )
where λ specifies the degree of measurement error and σzj the sample standard
deviation of regime characteristic zj . Afterwards, we apply our aggregation tool
to the biased regime characteristics and compare the resulting Machine Learning
indicators with our baseline indicators. Table B.7 presents the results of our
comparison for λ = 0.1 and λ = 0.2.27 We observe that the differences between
the biased and the original Machine Learning indices are quite small and almost
completely covered by our confidence intervals.
4.5.6 Redundant and spurious regime characteristics
A weak point of several democracy indices is that their aggregation functions
do not detect redundant regime characteristics, which in turn leads to double
counting (see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). To show how our Machine Learning
approach deals with this issue, we add redundant variables to our set of regime
characteristics and investigate whether such an extension has an effect on the
output of our method. Columns 1 and 3 of Table B.8 suggest that this not
case since we do not find notable changes in our indices if we use a variable
that almost perfectly correlates with the turnout rate as an additional regime
characteristic.28 Columns 2 and 4 of Table B.8 show that our indicators also
remain unchanged if we augment the set of regime characteristics by a random
variable.
4.5.7 Shape of the aggregation function
A concern about our aggregation procedure might be that we cannot provide a
formula which explicitly describes how our regime characteristics affect the level
of democracy, and thus cannot justify our aggregation rules through theoretical
considerations. Figure 1 tries to alleviate this legitimate concern by showing
scatter plots and results of bivariate non-parametric regressions. The left graph
illustrates the relationship between the level of democracy (as indicated by the
continuous Machine Learning index) and the regime characteristic ‘Comp V’. We
find that this relationship is positive and non-linear. This is plausible for two
reasons: First, political competition is a central aspect of democracy. A multi-
party regime should thus have a higher level of democracy than an otherwise
identical single- or no-party regime. Second, small differences in the number of
parliamentary seats won by a ruling and a runner-up party should not have
a notable effect on the level of democracy since these differences are usually
the consequence of popularity and performance differences rather than due to a
systematic lack of political competition.
The right graph of Figure 1 shows that the relationship between the voter
27Setting λ = 0.1 implies, for example that the turnout rate can vary by ± 3.4 percentage
points. Due to the experiences that we made during the data collection process, we believe
that this is a realistic error range.
28We also run this test with other regime characteristics and observe the same pattern. The
summary statistics of these tests are available upon request.
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Notes: This figure illustrates the relationship between our continuous Machine
Learning index and two of our regime characteristics. The red solid lines are the
results of bivariate non-parametric regressions.
turnout and the level of democracy is non-linear as well. In particular, we see
that our approach produces different democracy indicators for regimes with a
very high turnout rates. This suggests that our aggregation function takes the
other institutional aspects (e.g. the level of political competition) into account
when deciding about how changes in political participation affect the level of
democracy. We argue that such a differential treatment is reasonable because
political participation is meaningless if voters cannot choose between different
political parties.
4.5.8 Underlying concept of democracy
In Section 3, we stressed that some existing democracy indices can hardly be
used in empirical investigations because of their broad concept of democracy. A
potential questions is thus whether our indices suffer from the same problem. At
first glance, this seems to be unlikely since we only use regime characteristics
that are related to political participation, political competition, and the freedom
of opinion. However, a concern might be that the democratic (autocratic) regimes
that belong to the priming data do not only perform well (poorly) with regard
to our three dimensions of democracy but also with regard to aspects that are
typically taken into account when assuming broader concepts of democracies (e.g.
judiciary independence or the freedom of press). As a consequence, it might be
the case that our democracy indices unintentionally reflect a broad concept and
might thus create conceptual overlaps. To check whether this problem is likely
to exist, we broaden our concept of democracy by including the independence of
the judiciary as a fourth dimension.29 The rationale is that we can allay the
29We operationalize judiciary independence with two expert-based measures provided by V-Dem.
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Baseline definition Definition with judiciary independence
Notes: This figure shows continuous Machine Learning indices for Russia. The solid black line
shows the level of democracy that the SVM approach estimates when using our basic definition
of democracy. The red dashed line indicates how our indices would look like if we broaden our
definition of democracy by an additional aspect (judiciary independence).
aforementioned concern if we see that Machine Learning indices change due to
this conceptual extension. If we do not observe any change, it is rather likely
that our original indices already reflect a broad definition of democracy. Figure
2 illustrates based on the Russian indicators that our Machine Learning indices
react if we modify our definition of democracy. In particular, we find that the
Russian level of democracy is considerably lower when taking court independence
into account.30 We therefore believe that our original Machine Learning indices
are relatively unlikely to reflect a broad concept of democracy.31
4.6 Added value of using the Machine Learning procedure
4.6.1 Continuous indicator
In an earlier study, we compared the performance of various data aggregation
methods and showed how the choice of the aggregation technique affects the
results of regression analyses (see Gründler and Krieger, 2020). A key finding of
our study is that the index values for regimes at the lower/upper end of the
autocracy-democracy spectrum depend crucially on the choice of the aggregation
method. The explanation for these differences is that the aggregation methods
differ in their assumptions about the functional relationship between the regime
characteristics and the degree of democratization.
Figure 3 illustrates the difference that arises from using different aggregation
30We believe that this decrease is plausible because of the fairly low level of judiciary
independence in Russia (Sakwa, 2010).
31For other countries (e.g. Hungary, Poland), we find that our conceptual change has similar
consequences.
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Notes: This figure shows the level of democracy of Germany, depending on how
we aggregate our ten regime characteristics. For further details on the construction
of the additive and the multiplicative index, see Gründler and Krieger (2020).
methods based on the German level of democracy. We find that the additive
measure indicates the existence of some democratic structures during the Nazi
period (1933 – 1945), while the multiplicative and the Machine Learning index
suggest the absence of democracy. We think that the latter assessment is more
plausible because the Nazi party persecuted its opponents and heavily restricted
the freedom of opinion (Shirer, 1991).32 We also find notable difference for the
Post-World-War-II period. Our Machine Learning index does not indicate a lack
of democracy in Germany, whereas the additive and the multiplicative measure
suggest a non-negligible lack of democracy.33 We argue that the former result is
more plausible since all elections were free and highly competitive in Germany
since 1949 (Nohlen and Stöver, 2010).
In sum, we are convinced that our Machine Learning approach creates more
plausible indicators for highly autocratic and highly democratic regimes since it
produces a more flexible aggregation function (for more details, see Gründler and
Krieger, 2020).34 Another major advantage of our approach is that it produces
confidence intervals that reflect the extent of measurement uncertainty.35
32The additive measure indicates a non-negligible level of democracy for Nazi Germany since the
Nazi regime organized single-party elections, and because the additive approach assumes that
political participation affects the level of democracy independently from the other dimensions.
33The additive and the multiplicative index indicate a lack of democracy since they implicitly
assume that a country is only fully democratic if all regime characteristics reach their highest
level. We believe that this assumption is too strict. For example, if some people voluntarily
decide to abstain from voting, we can hardly argue that a lack of democracy exists.
34A concern might be that other aggregation tools perform better for hybrid regimes. Gründler
and Krieger (2020) allay this concern by showing that all methods that have been used so far
for the measurement of democracy produce rather similar indices for hybrid regimes.
35Figure 3 also illustrates that the level of measurement uncertainty varies across county-year
observations. In particular, we observe greater measurement uncertainty for the Weimar Republic
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Notes: The figure illustrates how the DD index, the BMR index, and our
dichotomous Machine Learning index classify Venezuela in the period from 2001
to 2009.
4.6.2 Dichotomous indicator
Our Machine Learning approach has three major strengths compared to other
approaches that produce dichotomous indices. The first strength is that our
method handles both binary and non-binary regime characteristics. The second
strength is that our algorithm classifies regimes in a objective and consistent
manner. The third strength is that our aggregation technique creates confidence
intervals.
We believe that the third feature of our approach is the most valuable from
an empirical perspective. To substantiate this view, we take a deeper look at
Venezuela in 2005. At this time, Venezuela was governed by President Hugo
Chávez and his socialist party. After assuming office in 1999, Hugo Chávez
implemented a number of reforms that reduced the power of the Venezuelan
parliament and limited the extent of political competition (Corrales, 2015, Hsieh
et al., 2011, Nohlen, 2005). As a consequence, some opposition parties withdrew
from the parliamentary election in 2005, which in turn further increased the
influence of Hugo Chávez and his socialist party. Figure 4 illustrates that
dichotomous democracy indices react differently to this event: the DD and the
Machine Learning index remain unchanged, whereas the BMR index indicates a
transition towards autocracy. We think that identifying the “correct” reaction is
impossible since the quality of the democratic institutions deteriorated gradually
in Venezuela.36 However, we also believe that our approach has an advantage
compared to the other approaches because we compute a distribution of indices
for each country-year observation and can thus reflect the extent of measurement
(1919 – 1933) than for the post-World-War-II period. We think that this is plausible and
consistent with the descriptions in qualitative studies.
36The DD (ML) index suggests that Venezuela became an autocratic regime in 2016 (2018).
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Notes: This figure compares the continuous Machine Learning index and V-Dem’s
Polyarchy index for the year 2019.
uncertainty. Figure 4 shows that the measurement uncertainty is high for the
period from 2005 to 2009. We think that this result is plausible given that the
Venezuela was a hybrid regime at this time.
4.7 Comparison with other indicators
To illustrate how our Machine Learning indices behave compared to established
indicators, we conduct two analyses. In the first analysis, we compare our
dichotomous Machine Learning index with the DD index (for details on the DD
index, see Section 3.2). For 2019, we find that there is a total overlap of 184
regimes, 162 of them are equally classified (88.04%). For 9 out of the other
22 countries, the Machine Learning index indicates a relatively high degree of
measurement uncertainty. This uncertainty suggests that these 9 countries are
neither highly democratic nor fully autocratic and that it is thus difficult to
classify them. Among the remaining countries, 4 discrepancies can be explained
by the fact that the DD index classifies a regime as a democracy only if an
alternation in power took place under the same election rules that brought the
incumbent into power. The other discrepancies between the dichotomous Machine
Learning indicator and the DD index exist because of methodological and other
conceptual differences.
Our second analysis compares the continuous Machine Learning indicator with
V-Dem’s Polyarchy indicator. To this end, we present a scatter plot in Figure
5 that compares the two indices for 2019. We find a strong positive correlation
(0.875). The most remarkable difference between the two indicators is that our
Machine Learning index uses the full value range, while almost all countries are
classified between 0.1 and 0.9 when considering V-Dem’s Polyarchy. As outlined
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in great detail by Gründler and Krieger (2020), a very likely explanation for this
difference is that the aggregation method applied by Teorell et al. (2019) creates
implausibly low (high) values for highly democratic (autocratic) regimes (see also
Section 4.6.1). From an empirical point of view, these behaviors are problematic
because they cause biased estimates in OLS and 2SLS regressions (Gründler and
Krieger, 2020).
4.8 Practitioner’s guide
Our Machine Learning democracy indicators are available for 186 countries in
the period from 1919 to 2019. We will update our democracy indicators on a
regular basis and publish our data on our website (www.ml-democracy-index.net).
Our website also informs about future methodological updates and presents more
detailed information about the data collection process.
Our database includes a continuous and a dichotomous democracy indicator.
These two indices are conceptually equivalent and can thus be used to check
whether the results of an analysis depend on the scale of the democracy index.
We think that such a robustness check should be done since scholars disagree
about whether democracy is better measured with a continuous or with a
dichotomous indicator. We do not take sides in this debate since both scaling
methods have their strengths and weaknesses (for an extensive discussion, see
Collier and Adcock, 1999). Practitioners should mention these pros and cons in
their studies and should also provide a well-founded explanation for their choice.
Following Solt (2019), we do not only report a single indicator for each
country-year observation, but also a distribution of democracy indicators. These
distributions can be used to take measurement uncertainties into account. A
number of approaches exist to do this. The simplest approach is to add the
standard deviation of the distribution as a control variable to the regression
model. A more sophisticated approach is to repeat the regression analysis with
different percentiles of the distribution (see e.g. Gründler and Krieger, 2020). A
third approach is to apply empirical methods that are usually used to handle
multiply imputed data (see e.g. Rubin, 2004, Solt, 2019).
5 Conclusion
Democracy indices are a frequently used tool in the applied political economy
literature. In this paper, we give an overview about nine popular measures of
democracy. Our review differs from other reviews since we pay attention to
aspects that are particular relevant for empirical research. We thus believe that
our paper helps practitioners to make quick and well-founded decisions about
which democracy indicator fits best to their purpose.
Our paper also presents a comprehensive update of the Machine Learning
democracy index that we developed some years ago (see Gründler and Krieger,
2016). The new Machine Learning indicators are available for 186 countries
and cover the period from 1919 to 2019. We believe that our indices nicely
complement the existing measures of democracy because we can address some
frequently mentioned weaknesses. For instance, our Machine Learning approach
allows us to avoid simplistic assumptions about the shape of the aggregation
function. Our approach is also the first that produces confidence intervals for
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dichotomous democracy indices.
We think that future research should try to provide more details about why
democracy indicators behave differently in empirical analyses. Some first studies
exist on this question, but we are convinced that there is need for more. For
example, we still know relatively little about how changes in the concept of
democracy affect regression results. Addressing this pending issue is of great
relevance since we can thus improve our understanding of why some democratic
regimes perform better than others.
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Appendix for online publication
A Support Vector Machines
In this supplementary section, we provide a short formal introduction to Support
Vector Classifications and Support Vector Regressions. Our description is based on
the textbooks by Abe (2005), Steinwart and Christmann (2008), and Vapnik (1995,
1998).37
A.1 Support Vector Classifications
The Support Vector Classification is a non- linear extension of the General Portrait
Algorithm (GPA). The basic GPA was proposed by Vapnik and Lerner (1963) and
assumes the existence of a hyperplane
Ew,b(x) = 〈w,x〉+ b w ∈ Rm , ||w|| = 1 , b ∈ R , x ∈ Rm (2)
that separates the observations in sample S = {(x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn)} according to
their labels y ∈ {−1, 1}.38 Graph I in Figure A.1 shows a unidimensional case in
which such a separation is possible.
The primary objective of the GPA is to find a linear classification function that
assigns any input xi to its output yi for all n > 1 observations in the sample S.
However, as Graph II in Figure A.1 indicates, the number of eligible hyperplanes
might be infinite. To find a unique solution, the GPA first computes the distance
(margin) between each separating hyperplane and its nearest observation, and then
chooses the hyperplane with the greatest margin in S (see Graphs III and IV in






〈w, w〉 s.t. yi · (〈w, xi〉 + b) ≥ 1 (3)
and that it uses the solution (w∗, b∗) to calculate the classification function:
F(x) = sign (〈w∗,x〉+ b∗) where w∗ ∈ Rm and b∗ ∈ R. (4)
In applied research fields, the GPA attracts only little attention since a linear
separation does not exist in general (see Figure A.2, Graph I). Boser et al. (1992)
therefore enhanced the original GPA such that it computes non-linear classification
functions. The idea behind this extension is simple: Boser et al. (1992) first use a
non-linear function Φ: Rm → H to map the input characteristics x ∈ Rm onto a
Reproducing Hilbert Space (H)39 and then apply the GPA to the adjusted sample
SH = {(Φ(xi), zi) | i = 1, . . . , n} to get a non-linear classification function (for a
graphical illustration, see Graphs II & III of Figure A.2).
Cortes and Vapnik (1995) suggest that random noise and measurement error may
lead to mislabeling. They therefore relax the auxiliary conditions of the GPA by
37Note that we already presented a similar introduction to SVM in one of our related papers (see
Gründler and Krieger, 2020).
38Note that 〈·, ·〉 indicates the dot product of two vectors.
39The non-linear extension suggested by Boser et al. (1992) is based on mathematical theorems that
prove the existence of a feature space H, in which a hyperplane can perfectly separate the sample
data S. For details, see Steinwart and Christmann (2008).
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Notes: Graph I is a one-dimensional example in which the GPA is applicable. Graph II shows
that more than one hyperplane may separate the observations according to their labels. Graph
III explains how the margin δ is calculated. Graph IV illustrates that the GPA selects the
hyperplane with the largest margin.
including slack variables ξi ≥ 0. Together with the non-linear GPA extension of





〈wH, wH〉 + C ·
n∑
i=1
ξi s.t. yi · (〈wH, Φ(xi)〉 + bH) ≥ 1 − ξi ∀ i (5)
where C denotes a fixed cost parameter for penalizing misclassifications.
When the dimension of H is very large, solving (5) might be computationally












zi · zj · αi · αj · 〈Φ(xi), Φ(xj)〉H s.t.
n∑
i=1
zi · αi = 0 (6)
where α1, . . . , αn are the Lagrange multipliers of the primal program. The closed







i 〈Φ(xi),Φ(x)〉H + b∗H
)
. (7)
The problem when computing (7) is that an appropriate feature map Φ: Rm → H
is usually not known. Schölkopf et al. (1998) therefore replace the unknown inner
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Notes: Graph I shows an example in which the GPA is not applicable in X = R. In Graph




is used to map the input data from X = R onto a feature space
H = R2 and GPA computes a dividing hyperplane in H. Graph III illustrates that the linear
solution in H implies a non-linear solution in X .





zi · α∗i · K(xi, x) + b∗H
)
.40 (8)
An observation is called Support Vector if its Lagrange multiplier α∗i is nonzero.
The algorithm takes its name from these observations because only Support Vectors
influence the shape of the classification function.
A.2 Support Vector Regressions
In its basic form, the GPA is limited to applications in which the output variable
comes from a countably finite set. Vapnik (1995, 1998) addresses this problem by
introducing a variant of the GPA that estimates real-valued functions. The key
objective of this procedure is to find a function F : X ⊆ Rm → Y ⊆ R whose
predicted outcomes deviate at most by ε ≥ 0 from the true outcome for all
observations in the sample S = {(x1, y1) . . . (xn, yn)}:
|F(xi) − yi |
!
≤ ε ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (9)
40The idea by Schölkopf et al. (1998), known as kernel trick, is based on a paper of Mercer (1909)
who found out that each kernel function K : Rm × Rm → R is related to a Reproducing Hilbert
Space H with:
K(xi,xj) = 〈Φ(xi), Φ(xj)〉H ∀xi,xj ∈ Rm.
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Achieving this goal is simple if the regression function is a hyperplane:
F(x) = 〈w, x〉 + b with w ∈ Rm and b ∈ R (10)






· ||w ||2 s.t.
{
zi − 〈w, xi〉 − b ≤ ε ∀ i
〈w, xi〉 + b − zi ≤ ε ∀ i.
(11)
However, this approach has the problem that solving (11) often turns out to be
impossible in practical applications. Vapnik (1995, 1998) therefore introduces slack
variables (ξ+i , ξ
−
i ) ∈ R2+ that relax the auxiliary conditions and uses a feature map
Φ: X → H that allows for non-linear estimations. These extension change the
optimization problem to:
min















zi − 〈w, Φ(xi)〉 − b ≤ ε + ξ+i








































i ∈ [0, C],
where we denote by α+ = (α+1 , . . . , α
+
n ) and α
− = (α−1 , . . . , α
−
n ) the Lagrangian










· 〈Φ(xi), Φ(x)〉H + b∗H. (13)
Since the mapping function Φ: X → H is not known, Vapnik (1995, 1998) replaces
the unknown inner product 〈Φ(xi), Φ(x)〉H with a kernel K : Rm × Rm → R. The




(αi − α∗i ) · K(xi, x) + b∗H. (14)
is only depending on those observations (called Support Vectors) whose Lagrangian
multipliers (αi, α
∗
i ) are different from zero.
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B Additional tables
Table B.1 Priming data — Selected country-years.
Country Observations Years
Democratic regimes
Australia 53 1950, 1962 – 1964, 1967 –1968, 1972 – 2018
Austria 68 1950 – 2017
Bahamas 1 2017
Barbados 1 2017
Belgium 70 1950 – 2019
Brazil 24 1991, 1993 – 2015
Canada 27 1976 – 1979, 1988 – 1992, 2002 – 2019
Chile 19 1998, 2000 – 2017
Costa Rica 40 1980 – 2019
Cyprus 7 2008 – 2009, 2011 – 2013, 2015, 2017
Czech Republic 23 1991 – 2012, 2014
Denmark 70 1950 – 2019
Dominica 1 2017
Estonia 26 1993 – 2012, 2014 – 2019
Finland 50 1967 – 1971, 1975 – 2019
France 30 1975 – 1977, 1988 – 1996, 2002 – 2019
Germany 61 1957 – 2017
Greece 34 1986 – 2019
Hungary 10 1994 – 1997, 2002 – 2005, 2007 – 2008
Iceland 48 1971 – 2018
Ireland 32 1987 – 1988, 1990 – 2019
Italy 65 1950 – 2007, 2013 – 2019
Japan 28 1959 – 1960, 1967 – 1969, 1973 – 1976, 1980 – 1982, 1990 –
1992, 1997 – 2004, 2010 – 2013, 2017
Korea (South) 8 1998 – 2000, 2004 – 2007, 2018
Latvia 3 2013, 2015 – 2016
Luxembourg 46 1950 – 1953, 1955, 1960 – 1963, 1974 – 1979, 1984 – 1993,
1999 – 2019
Malta 13 2000, 2003 – 2008, 2010 – 2011, 2014 – 2017
Netherlands 63 1956 – 2018
New Zealand 46 1950, 1973, 1975 – 2017, 2019
Norway 60 1960 – 2019
Poland 22 1992 – 1997, 2000 – 2015
Portugal 38 1982 – 2019
Slovakia 7 2004 – 2006, 2008, 2010 – 2011, 2016
Slovenia 20 1992 – 2000, 2002 – 2004, 2009 – 2016
Spain 40 1980 – 2019
St. Kitts and Nevis 7 2005, 2010 – 2014, 2017
St. Lucia 6 2009 – 2010, 2013 – 2015, 2017
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
3 2013 – 2014, 2017
Sweden 70 1950 – 2019
Switzerland 39 1980 – 2000, 2002 – 2019
United Kingdom 39 1950 – 1954, 1961, 1964, 1979, 1987 – 1996, 1999 – 2019
United States 30 1983 – 1992, 1994 – 2000, 2004 – 2016
Uruguay 30 1989 – 2017, 2019
Autocratic regimes
Afghanistan 38 1950 – 1963, 1978 – 2001
Albania 40 1950 – 1989
Algeria 19 1965 – 1976, 1980 – 1981, 1983 – 1987
Angola 18 1975 – 1992






















Bahrain 29 1971 – 1972, 1975 – 2000, 2016
Benin 7 1973 – 1979
Bhutan 54 1950 – 2003
Bolivia 6 1972 – 1977
Brazil 4 1965 – 1966, 1968 – 1969
Brunei 14 1984, 1986 – 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001
Burma (Myanmar) 36 1963 – 1974, 1983 – 1987, 1989, 1991 – 2008
Burundi 19 1967 – 1981, 1988 – 1991
Cambodia 20 1953, 1957 – 1969, 1975, 1980, 1982 – 1985
Central African Rep. 15 1966 – 1979, 2017
Chad 28 1962 – 1974, 1976 – 1989, 2017
Chile 14 1974 – 1987
China 47 1950 – 1980, 1990 – 1991, 2000 – 2001, 2003 – 2004, 2009,
2011 – 2019
Democratic Rep. of Congo 26 1965 – 1989, 2017
Rep. of Congo 5 1969 – 1972, 1977
Cuba 32 1961 – 1992
Dominican Republic 11 1950 – 1960
Egypt 4 1953 – 1956
Equatorial Guinea 11 1973 – 1982, 2017
Eritrea 18 2002 – 2019
Ethiopia 37 1950 – 1986
Gabon 10 1968 – 1972, 1981, 1983 – 1984, 1986 – 1987
Germany (East) 29 1960 – 1988
Ghana 1 1965
Greece 6 1968 – 1973
Grenada 4 1980 – 1983
Guatemala 4 1956, 1964 – 1965, 1983
Guinea 27 1958 – 1984
Haiti 26 1950, 1961 – 1985
Iran 25 1954 – 1978
Iraq 40 1963 – 2002
Ivory Coast 25 1960 – 1974, 1980 – 1989
Jordan 33 1950, 1957 – 1988
Korea (North) 58 1958 – 1962, 1966 – 2018
Korea (South) 1 1972
Kuwait 19 1961 – 1962, 1965 – 1970, 1976 – 1980, 1986 – 1991
Laos 39 1976 – 1988, 1991 – 2016
Lesotho 3 1970 – 1972
Liberia 3 1981 – 1983
Lybia 47 1951 – 1955, 1969 – 2010
Malawi 29 1964 – 1992
Maldives 2 1965 – 1966
Mauritania 6 1979 – 1984
Mongolia 2 1950 – 1951
Morocco 19 1956 – 1962, 1965 – 1976
Mozambique 10 1975 – 1980, 1982 – 1985
Nepal 22 1950 – 1951, 1960 – 1979
Niger 5 1976, 1982 – 1985
Oman 32 1970 – 2001
Panama 3 1969 – 1971
Paraguay 7 1954 – 1960
Peru 2 1969, 1973
Philippines 6 1972 – 1977
Portugal 20 1950 – 1959, 1961 – 1964, 1966 – 1971
Qatar 49 1971 – 2019
Russia 10 1950 – 1953, 1963, 1965 – 1969






















Sao Tome and Principe 6 1983 – 1988
Saudi Arabia 70 1950 – 2019
Serbia 14 1950 – 1952, 1954 – 1957, 1964 – 1966, 1968 – 1969, 1974,
1978
Somalia 13 1970 – 1979, 1986, 2011 2017
South Sudan 1 2017
Spain 18 1950 – 1967
Sudan 13 1959 – 1964, 1990 – 1995, 2017
Swaziland 31 1973 – 1999, 2001 – 2003, 2005
Syria 34 1961, 1970 – 1975, 1978 – 1999, 2013 – 2017
Taiwan 20 1950 – 1969
Tajikistan 1 2017
Togo 12 1968 – 1979
Tonga 1 1970
Tunisia 15 1956 – 1959, 1961 – 1964, 1966 – 1969, 1971, 1979 – 1980
Turkmenistan 25 1992 – 2013, 2015 – 2017
Uganda 9 1972 – 1980
United Arab Emirates 45 1971 – 2015
Uruguay 4 1976 – 1979
Uzbekistan 25 1993 – 2017
Venezuela 5 1953 – 1957
Vietnam 6 1954 – 1959
Yemen 33 1950 – 1970, 1977 – 1987, 2017
Zambia 2 1981, 1989
Notes: This table reports the country-year observations that are part of the priming data. The selection
is based on the UDS and V-Dem’s Polyarchy index.
Table B.2 Agreement among democracy indices about labeled observations.
Democratic regimes
Polity (≥ 7) LIED (= 6) FH (Free) BMR (= 1) BR (= 1)
Overlap 0.9944 1.0000 0.9924 1.0000 1.0000
Autocratic regimes
Polity (≤ −7) LIED (≤ 1) FH (Not Free) BMR (= 0) BR (= 0)
Overlap 0.9511 0.9244 0.8976 0.9994 1.0000
Notes: This table shows agreement rates, i.e. the share of country-year observations in the priming data
that are labeled as “autocratic” (“democratic”) and are classified as autocracy (democracy) by an alternative
index. The list of alternative indices includes: the Polity IV index, the Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy
(Skaaning et al., 2015), the Freedom House index, and the dichotomous indices by Boix et al. (2013), and
Bjørnskov and Rode (2020).
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Table B.3 Mislabeled regimes in priming data
Continuous Indicator Dichotomous Indicator
Total Cuba Ireland Total Cuba Ireland
Mean Abs. Dev. 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.017 0.000 0.000
Coverage rate 0.994 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table shows how our Machine Learning indicators reacts if the priming data includes
wrongly classified regimes. To illustrate this reaction, we falsified all Irish and Cuban observations in
the priming data.
Table B.4 Representativeness of autocratically labeled regimes.
Regime Elections Duration
Σ Yes No ≤ 5 years 6 – 25 years > 25 years
Civil dictator. 311 242 69 92 190 29
Communist dictator. 365 241 124 50 176 139
Military dictator. 420 116 304 162 210 48
Royal dictator. 501 140 361 43 173 285
1,597 739 858 347 749 501
Notes: Our Machine Learning approach requires that the priming data reflects the institutional heterogeneity
among autocracies and democracies. This table shows how the autocratically labeled country-year observations
are distributed over different categories. The data comes from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) and Geddes et al.
(2014).
Table B.5 Representativeness of democratically labeled regimes.
Regime Legislature Voting system
Σ Unicameral Bicameral Proportional Majoritarian
Parliamentary 876 367 509 675 201
Semi-presidential 305 120 185 275 30
Presidential 197 55 142 159 38
1,378 542 836 1,109 269
Notes: Our Machine Learning approach requires that the priming data reflects the institutional heterogeneity
among autocracies and democracies. This table shows how the democratically labeled country-year
observations are distributed over different categories. The data comes from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020).
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Table B.6 Alternative labeling criteria
UDS Polyarchy Add Polity 7.5/92.5 12.5/87.5
Continuous Machine Learning indicator
Mean Abs. Dev. 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.017 0.007
Coverage rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dichotomous Machine Learning indicator
Mean Abs. Dev. 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.015 0.003
Coverage rate 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table shows how our Machine Learning indicators reacts if we adjust the criterion that we
use to specify the priming data. In our basic specification, we use the upper and lower deciles of the
UDS index and V-Dem’s Polyarchy index. In Columns 1 and 2, we use only one of these indices. In
Column 3, we use the Polity index as additional index. In Columns 4 (5), we label the upper and
lower 7.5 (12.5) percent of the distributions.
Table B.7 Measurement error in raw data
Continuous Indicator Dichotomous Indicator
λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2 λ = 0.1 λ = 0.2
Mean Abs. Dev. 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.007
Coverage rate 0.996 0.974 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table shows how our Machine Learning indicators reacts if the regime characteristics suffer
from measurement error.
Table B.8 Random and redundant regime characteristics.
Continuous Indicator Dichotomous Indicator
Redundant Random Redundant Random
Mean Abs. Dev. 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.0038
Coverage rate 0.992 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: This table shows how our Machine Learning indicators reacts if augment our set of regime
characteristics by a redundant/spurious variable.
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Table B.9 Frequently used measures of democracy
Name Provider Time span Definition Scale Aggregation rule Conceptual overlaps Confidence intervals
Boix-Miller-Rosato index Boix et al.
(2018)






1950 – 2018 Narrow Dichotomous Multiplicative approach No No
Polity IV index Marshall
et al. (2019)






1972 – 2020 Broad Quasi-
continuous/ordinal











1810 – 2018 Narrow Continuous Multiplicative approach No No
Unified Democracy Score Márquez
(2018)







1789 – 2019 Realistic Ordinal Hierarchical approach No No
V-Dem’s Polyarchy index Coppedge
et al. (2019)




Notes: This table gives a brief overview about the nine most popular measures of democracy. In particular, we indicate who publishes the last update of this index and
indicate the time span of each index. We also provide information about the conceptual and methodological aspects of each index. For a more extensive description, see
Section 3.
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